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Criminal Appellate Procedure-CONFLICT OF LAWS-STATE 
RIGHT TO APPEAL IN A CRIMINAL CASE REMOVED TO FEDERAL 
COURT-Arizona v. Manypenny, 608 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1979). 
While on duty in Arizona as a border patrolman of the 
United States Immigration and Naturalization Services, William 
Dale Manypenny fired three shotgun blasts at a fleeing suspect, 
hitting him in the back and paralyzing him. The State of Arizona 
brought a criminal prosecution against Manypenny in state 
court, charging him with assault with a deady weapon.' On 
Manypenny's motion, the case was removed to federal court.' 
The case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict of 
guilty. Manypenny then made a motion for arrest of judgment, 
which was granted.3 The state responded with a motion for re- 
consideration, which was also granted. Upon reconsideration, 
the district court construed Manypenny's motion for arrest of 
judgment as a motion for acquittal. Relying on its own mishan- 
dling of the governmental immunity issue,4 the district court 
granted the motion for acquitta1,l set aside the jury's verdict, 
and held Manypenny not guilty! 
The state sought appellate review of the district court's ac- 
1. The charge was brought under ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 13-249(A)-(B) (1976). 
2. The removal was ordered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1976), which provides: 
A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court against 
any of the following persons may be removed by them to the district court of 
the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is 
pending: 
(1) Any officer of the United States or any agency thereof, or person 
acting under him, for any act under color of such office or on account 
of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress for 
the apprehension or punishment of criminals or the collection of the 
revenue. 
3. Manypenny moved for arrest of judgment under FED. R. CRIM. P. 34 or, alterna- 
tively, for a new trial under FED. R. CRIM. P. 33. The court granted the Rule 34 motion. 
4. The district court said: 
Procedurally, it is unclear if the determination as to whether defendant Many- 
penny was carrying out federal duties in performing the act should be decided 
as a question of law by the Court or should be decided by a jury as a question 
of fact. . . . 
In either event, this Court committed fundamental error; the issue was not 
properly resolved by the Court a t  the time of trial. The Court should have 
considered this principle of law and thus granted defendant's motion for verdict 
of acquittal or failing that should have submitted the matter to the jury on 
altogether different instructions which embodied this federal law on the matter 
of the officer's reasonable belief. 
Arizona v. Manypenny, 445 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (D. Ariz. 1977). 
5. The judgment of acquittal was granted under FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(c). 
6. Arizona v. Manypenny, 445 F. Supp. 1123, 1127-28 (D. Ariz. 1977). 
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tion before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. A three- 
judge panel considered the appeal and, with one judge dissenting, 
dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. The majority concluded that  
the state did not have the specific statutory authorization re- 
quired for the prosecution to appeal an adverse decision in a 
criminal case .7 
Whether a state has a right of appeal when prosecuting a 
criminal case in federal court is a question that has never before 
been litigated."lthough i t  has not arisen before, i t  is an ex- 
tremely important question. If states lose their right to appeal in 
criminal prosecutions against federal officers when those prosecu- 
tions are removed to federal court, the delicate balance of federal- 
ism will be upset. 
A. Federalism and Criminal Law 
The nature of the balance between state and national inter- 
ests in the federal system was illuminated in Younger v. Harris,' 
in which the Supreme Court defined federalism as 
a system in which there is sensitivity to the ligitimate interests 
of both State and National Governments, and in which the Na- 
tional Government, anxious though i t  may be to vindicate and 
7. Arizona v. Manypenny, 608 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1979). 
8. However, the question whether the District of Columbia or the Virgin Islands, 
neither of which is a sovereign state, can appeal such a decision has been litigated. In 
United States v. Cefaratti, 202 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 907 (1953), 
the court of appeals found that the government had broad rights of appeal in the District 
of Columbia because of a statute passed by Congress to govern criminal prosecutions in 
the District of Columbia. D.C. CODE Sj 23-105 (1951) (current version at  D.C. CODE @ 23- 
104 (1973)). 
In Government of Virgin Islands v. Hamilton, 475 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1973), the Third 
Circuit ruled that the government of the Virgin Islands had no right to appeal from an 
adverse decision of the federal district court in a criminal case because there was no 
statutory authorization for such an appeal. Hamilton is distinguishable from the instant 
case. The Virgin Islands is a territory and the federal district court serves as an appellate 
court for the Municipal Court of the Virgin Islands, while in the instant case Arizona is a 
sovereign state and the criminal case was removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 
1442(a)(1) (1976). 
9. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Younger u. Harris involved an attempt by a criminal defendant 
to have a district attorney enjoined from prosecuting him under an act that was allegedly 
unconstitutional on its face. A three-judge district court declared the act overbroad and 
void for vagueness and granted the injunction. The Supreme Court reversed, relying in 
part on the concept of federalism. See Dittfurth, The Younger Abstention Doctrine: Pri- 
mary State Jurisdiction Over Law Enforcement, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 445 (1979). 
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protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to 
do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate 
activities of the States.'" 
The Supreme Court has recognized that preventing and dealing 
. with crime is one of these legitimate state activities and "much 
more the business of the States than it is of the Federal Govern- 
ment."" 
The recognition that dealing with crime is primarily the busi- 
ness of the states has led to "a strong judicial policy against 
federal interference with state criminal proceedings."I2 Not only 
have the courts adhered to this policy, but "[slince the begin- 
ning of this country's history Congress has, subject to few excep- 
tions, manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state cases 
free from interference by federal  court^."^^ And yet, the federal 
government has recognized, by enacting 28 U.S.C. $ 144214 and 
its predecessors, that it must interfere in certain state prosecu- 
tions in order to protect itself in the exercise of its constitutional 
powers.YI'he federal government needs to intervene in prosecu- 
tions against federal officers for acts committed under color of 
their offices by removing the prosecutions to federal court be- 
cause the federal government 
can act only through its officers and agents, and they must act 
within the States. If, when thus acting, and within the scope of 
their authority, those officers can be arrested and brought to 
trial in a State court, for an alleged offence against the law of 
the State, . . . and if the general government is powerless to 
interfere at once for their protection, . . . the operations of the 
general government may a t  any time be arrested a t  the will of 
one of its members. The legislation of a State may be unfriendly. 
It may affix penalties to acts done under the immediate direc- 
tion of the national government, and in obedience to its 
10. 401 U.S. at  44. The Supreme Court defined the related notion of "comity" as 
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire 
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance 
of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their 
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate 
ways. 
Id. 
11. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977). 
12. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 600 (1975). 
13. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. a t  43. 
14. (1976). This statute provides for removal to federal court of criminal prosecutions 
against federal agents or officers. For the text of subsec. (a) of 5 1442, see note 2 supra. 
15. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1879). 
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laws. . . . And even if, after trial and final judgment in the 
State court, the case can be brought into the United States court 
for review, the officer is withdrawn from the discharge of his 
duty during the pendency of the prosecution, and the exercise 
of acknowledged Federal power arrested.16 
The conflict between a state's interest in enforcing its own 
laws and the federal government's interest in protecting its offi- 
cers and agents in the legitimate performance of their duties cre- 
ates a serious problem for federalism. The removal approach is 
an elegant solution to this problem. It allows a state to continue 
its prosecution while permitting the defendant to plead a defense 
of governmental immunity" in a forum receptive to that defense. 
If the federal courts are evenhanded in their application of the 
law, the removal approach does not upset the balance of federal- 
ism; federal interests and rights can be vindicated in a way that 
does not unduly interfere with legitimate state activities. 
B. Choice of Law in Criminal Cases 
Removed to Federal Court 
The Erie doctrine governing choice of law in civil diversity 
cases does not apply in criminal removal cases.lR Instead, choice 
of law in criminal removal cases is governed by a separate set of 
rules that has grown out of the special considerations in this area 
of the law. For instance, the federal courts look to state law to 
define the criminal offense." If they did not, removal would de- 
feat the prosecution because there is usually not a comparable 
federal law to apply. And, of necessity, federal law must govern 
the defense of official immunity,*O which the removal statutes 
were designed to ~afeguard.~' Otherwise, a state could abrogate 
the official immunity defense. 
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure "apply to criminal 
16. Id. a t  263. 
17. "If a person is authorized to do an act by the law of the United States, and if he 
does no more than what is necessary and proper for him to  do, he is innocent of any crime 
against the laws of any state." Arizona v. Manypenny, 445 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (D. Ariz. 
1977). See Clifton v. Cox, 549 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1977) (discussing the history and present 
status of the official immunity defense). 
18. The Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. $ 1652 (1976), upon which the Erie doctrine 
is based, is limited by its terms to civil cases. Decisions subsequent to Erie R.R. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), have limited the holding of Erie almost exclusively to 
diversity cases. E.R., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947). 
19. North Carolina v. Gosnell, 74 F. 734, 735 (C.C.W.D.N.C. 1896). 
20. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 272 (1879). 
21. Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407 (1969). 
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prosecutions removed to the United States district courts from 
state courts and govern all procedure after removal."22 The Advi- 
sory Committee on Rules states in a note following Rule 54 that 
in removal cases under 28 U.S.C. 1442 "the Federal court ap- 
plies the substantive law of the State, but follows Federal proce- 
dure ."23 
The case law supports the Advisory Committee's formula- 
tion. In Tennessee v .  Davis2"he Supreme Court held a predeces- 
sor of section 1442 constitutional and answered for the first time 
the question whether there was any mode of procedure prescribed 
in criminal removal cases. In that case the Court said: 
[Tlhe mode of trial is sufficiently obvious. The circuit courts 
of the United States have all of the appliances which are needed 
for the trial of any criminal case. They adopt and apply the laws 
of the State in civil cases, and there is no more difficulty in 
administering the State's criminal law. They are not foreign 
courts. . . . [I]n cases of criminal prosecutions for alleged of- 
fences against a State, in which arises a defence under United 
States law, the general government should take cognizance of 
the case and try it in its own courts, according to its own forms 
of proceeding.*" 
The cases subsequent to Tennessee v .  Davis have uniformly 
agreed that state law should govern the substantive rights of the 
parties and federal law should govern the pr~cedure.~Wnfortun- 
ately, not everything is clearly substantive or clearly procedural, 
and case law does not provide much guidance for making that 
distinction in a close case. 
C.  Limitations on Appeals by the Prosecution 
The state prosecution's right of appeal was called into ques- 
tion in Manypenny because of the rule prohibiting appeals by the 
prosecution without express statutory authorization. This rule 
has its roots in English common law.27 It stems from the same 
22. FED. R. CRIM. P. 54(b)(l). 
23. 18 U.S.C. app. Rule 54(b)(l) note (1976). 
24. 100 U.S. 257 (1879). 
25. Id. at 271-72. See also Maryland v. Soper (No. I),  270 U.S. 9, 32 (1926). 
26. See, e .g. ,  Miller v. Kentucky, 40 F.2d 820, 822 (6th Cir. 1930); Carter v. Tennes- 
see, 18 F.2d 850, 855 (6th Cir. 1927); Virginia v. Felts, 133 F. 85,92 (C.C.W.D. Va. 1904). 
27. See Will v.  United States, 389 U.S. 90,96-97 (1967); Carroll v. United States, 354 
U.S. 394, 400 (1957); United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 312 (1892). See generally 
Article, Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals in Criminal Cases, 12 COLUM. J L. & 
Soc. PROB. 295 (1976); Comment, Double Jeopardy Limitations on Appeals by the Govern- 
CASENOTE 
considerations that spawned the double jeopardy prohibi- 
tionzR-"a general policy in favor of finality and against repeated 
ve~ations"~%f the defendant. Early in the history of this country 
an overwhelming majority of state courts adopted this rule limit- 
ing appeals by the pro~ecut ion.~~ In response, most state legisla- 
tures enacted statutes that gave the prosecution a right of appeal 
at  least in certain  circumstance^.^^ 
Although state courts quickly adopted rules limiting the 
right of state prosecutors to appeal, the Supreme Court of the 
United States was not confronted with the question whether fed- 
eral prosecutors had an inherent right of appeal until United 
States v. S a n ~ e s ~ ~  in 1892. In Sanges the Supreme Court followed 
the weight of state authority and adopted the rule that the prose- 
cution" has no right of appeal without express authorization by 
statute?' In subsequent decisions federal courts have unalteringly 
adhered to this rule requiring express statutory authorization; a 
general grant of jurisdiction such as 28 U.S.C. 8 1291" has not 
ment in Criminal Cases, 80 DICK. L. REV. 525 (1976); Comment, Double Jeopardy and 
Government Appeals of Criminal Dismissals, 52 TEX. L., REV. 303 (1974); Note, Limited 
Right of Appeal for the State, 14 Hous. L. REV. 735 (1977). 
28. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
29. Article, Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals in Criminal Cases, 12 COLUM. 
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 295, 303 (1976). 
30. For a survey of early state cases, see United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 312 
(1892). According to one commentator, a few state courts have held that their states have 
an inherent right of appeal, a t  least in some circumstances. See Note, Criminal 
Procedure-Right of the State to Appeal, 45 K Y .  L.J. 628, 628 & n.3 (1957). 
31. One commentator has noted; 
Today only Texas, Georgia, and Nevada have no right of appeal in criminal 
cases from an adverse judgment; conversely, three states, Connecticut, Ver- 
mont, and Wisconsin, have a right of appeal equal to defendant's. Between these 
extremes are jurisdictions which recognize by statute the State's right of appeal 
from pretrial motions and on questions of law. 
Note, Limited Right of Appeal for the State, 14 Hous. L. REV. 735, 737 (1977). 
32. 144 U.S. 310 (1892). 
33. The Court's adoption of this rule in Sanges has been binding only on federal 
prosecutors. Each state has been free to adopt or reject this rule. And it is not clear 
whether all states have adopted the rule. See State v. Lee, 64 Conn. 265,30 A. 1110 (1894). 
It was not until Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), that the Court even held that 
the fifth amendment's double jeopardy prohibition applied to the states through the 
fourteenth amendment. 
34. 144 U.S. a t  312, 323. 
35. (1976). Known as the final judgment rule, § 1291 reads: 
The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final deci- 
sions of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court 
for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the 
Supreme Court. 
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been enough? 
Congress responded to Sanges and its progeny with the Crim- 
inal Appeals Act of 1907,:'' which gave the government limited 
rights of appeal. In 1971 Congress amended the Act,:Vxoadening 
the government's right of appeal to all cases in which the Consti- 
tution does not prohibit an appeal." The legislative history of the 
1971 amendments makes it clear that Congress intended to im- 
prove the effectiveness of law enforcement and the quality of 
criminal justice by removing archaic barriers to appeals by fed- 
eral prosecutors. J0 
In the instant case the Ninth Circuit was confronted with the 
novel question: Does a state prosecution have a right of appeal 
in a criminal case removed to federal court? Although recognizing 
that their decision would substantially affect "the delicate bal- 
ance of our federal system,"" the majority held that there was no 
statutory authorization for such an appeal. 
The court applied the widely accepted rule that the prosecu- 
tion has no right to appeal an adverse decision without express 
statutory authorization. After examining the federal enabling 
statute, 18 U.S.C. 5 3731,J2 and its legislative history,':' the major- 
ity concluded that since Congress had not considered appeals by 
state prosecutors, the statute should be strictly construed as au- 
36. See, e.g., Dibella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 130 (1962). 
37. Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246 (current version a t  18 U.S.C. § 3731 
(1976)). 
38. Act of Jan. 2, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-644, 14(a), 84 Stat. 1890 (codified a t  18 
U.S.C. Q 3731 (1976)). 
39. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 337 (1975). See generally 1978 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 742. 
40. S. REP. NO. 1296, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 18-19 (1970). 
41. 608 F.2d at 1200. 
42. (1976). The statute provides in part: 
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of 
appeals from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an 
indictment or information as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal 
shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution 
prohibits further prosecution. 
. . . .  
The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed to effectuate its 
purposes. 
18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976) (emphasis added). 
43. S. REP. NO. 1296, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970); H.R. REP. NO. 1768, 91st Cong., 
2d Sess. 21 (1970). 
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thorizing only appeals by federal prosecutors. The majority also 
held that the court could not look to a state statute to authorize 
an appeal by state prosecutors because federal law rather than 
state law governs cases removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. 
4 l442(a) (1) .JJ 
Judge Kennedy, in a dissenting opinion, expressed concern 
that the decision would create serious federalism problems. He 
offered several bases for appeallate jurisdiction to avoid these 
problems. First, he argued that 18 U.S.C. (j 3731 should be liber- 
ally construed to authorize an appeal by a state prosecuting in 
federal court. Second, he argued that 28 U.S.C. 8 1291J5 granted 
appellate jurisdiction. Finally, he rejected the majority's conclu- 
sion that federal law governed all aspects of the case. Citing a 
note of the Advisory Committee on Rules that states that in sec- 
tion 1442 removal cases, "the Federal Courts apply the substan- 
tive law of the State, but follow Federal p r o ~ e d u r e , " ~ ~  the'dissent 
suggested that the right of appeal could be considered substan- 
tive, thus coming under state law. 
A. The Effect of the Manypenny Decision 
The decision in Manypenny creates an unfortunate situa- 
tion: when a criminal prosecution is removed to federal court, the 
state is denied any right of appeal that it would otherwise have 
had in its own courts. The denial of such a substantial right is a 
serious invasion of state sovereignty, an invasion that upsets the 
delicate balance of the federal system. Moreover, the decision 
places unlimited power in the hands of a federal trial judge to 
acquit another federal official who may have committed serious 
offenses against a state or its citizenry. With such power concen- 
trated in the hands of one person whose actions are not subject 
to review, the potential for abuse is great. The result of the deci- 
sion is as anomalous as it is unfortunate when contrasted with the 
congressional policy allowing the federal government to bring any 
appeal not barred by the C o n s t i t ~ t i o n , ~ ~  a policy formulated to 
prevent district court judges from frustrating congressional objec- 
tives in law enforcement? 
44. 608 F.2d at 1200. 
45. See notes 35-36 and accompanying text supra. 
46. 18 U.S.C. app. Rule 54(b)(l) note (1976). 
47. See note 39 and accompanying text supra. 
48. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 105 (3d ed. 1976). 
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R. Flaws i n  the  Court's Analysis 
The majority in Manaypenny recognized some of the negative 
consequences that would result from their decision b@ felt com- 
pelled by their analysis of the applicable law to deny the state a 
right of appeal.lP However, this conclusion is not the only rational 
conclusion that can be drawn; as the dissent pointed out, there 
are other ways to analyze the issues, some of which lead to a 
better result. Had the court used an analytical approach that 
more squarely faced the issues presented by this case, it probably 
would have decided the case differently. 
The major flaw in the court's analytical approach was that 
it did not first consider whether state or federal law governed the 
state's right of appeal in a criminal removal case. Instead, the 
court a priori assumed that the case was governed by the federal 
version of the rule requiring express statutory authorization for an 
appeal by the prosecution. Implicit in the application of the fed- 
eral version of the rule was the assumption that federal law gov- 
erns the right of appeal in section 1442 removal cases. Conse- 
quently, the court first looked to a federal statute to satisf'y the 
requirement of statutory authorization. 
After deciding that the federal statute did not authorize an 
appeal by the state, the majority summarily dismissed the possi- 
bility tha t  a state statute could provide such authorization." 
While it is not impossible to conclude that state law does not 
apply in this context, the court's reasoning and the authority that 
it cited cannot support this conclusion. 
The court's argument against using state law to authorize an 
appeal consisted of the following syl10gism:~~ 
First premise: 
"In a case arising under federal law, federal law, rather than 
state law, ~ontrols ."~~ 
Second premise: 
"A case before the federal courts under 9 1442(a)(l) is one 
- -  
49. The majority in Manypenn.~ stated: 
We share the concerns expressed by Judge Kennedy in his dissent that the 
policy of 9 3731, which is designed to "prevent erroneous trial court rulings from 
thwarting lawful prosecutions," is equally applicable to state prosecutions and 
federal prosecutions, and that not allowing state appeals in cases removed to 
the federal courts under 5 1442(a)(l) has a substantial effect on the delicate 
balance of our federal system. However, we cannot rewrite § 3731 for Congress. 
608 F.2d a t  1200. 
50. Id. 
51. The court reversed the order of the parts, stating the conclusion first, then the 
second premise, and finally, the first premise. 
52. 608 F.2d at 1200. 
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within the judicial power of the United States, for it arises under 
federal law. "53 
Conclusion: 
"[We cannot] look to state law as providing Arizona with a 
right to appeal in this case."54 
The court cited several civil casesss to support the first premise, 
and Tennessee v. Daviss6 to support the second. The authority 
used by the court to support its argument is faulty because (1) 
the distinction between civil law and criminal law weakens, if not 
destroys, the precedential value of the civil cases used to support 
the first premise, and (2) criminal removal cases do not "arise 
under" federal law in the same sense as do federal, nondiversity 
civil cases 
None of the civil cases cited by the court were grounded on 
rights created by state law. In every instance, the right sought to 
be enforced was created by federal statute." Criminal removal 
cases originate under state law in state courts. In the context of 
a criminal removal case such as Tennessee v. Davis, the state- 
ment, "[a] case before the federal courts under § 1442(a)(l) is 
one within the judicial power of the United States, for it arises 
under federal law,"" means only that federal courts are constitu- 
tionalIy empowered to try a criminal case that has been removed 
from a state court pursuant to a federal statute. Tennessee v. 
Davis actually supports the conclusion that federal courts should 
try criminal removal cases under state substantive law using fed- 
eral p r o c e d ~ r e . ~ ~  
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 456 (1942); Deitrick v. Greaney, 
309 U.S. 190, 200-01 (1940); Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 
349-53 (1939); United States v. Crain, 589 F.2d 996, 998 (9th Cir. 1979). 
56. 100 U.S. a t  262-65. 
57. Judge Choy. who wrote the opihion in Man.ypenn.y, may have relied too heavily 
on reasoning and authority from the opinion in United States v. Crain, 589 F.2d 996 (9th 
Cir. 1979), which he authored earlier in 1979. Compare 608 F.2d a t  1200 with 589 F.2d a t  
998-99. 
58. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942), and Deitrick v. Greaney, 
309 U.S. 190 (1940). were based on violations of federal banking law; Board of County 
Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939), was based on rights flowing from a federal 
statute and a treaty between the United States and an Indian nation; United States v. 
Crain, 589 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1979), was based on a loan transaction authorized by federal 
statute. 
59. 608 F.2d a t  1200. 
60. 100 U.S. a t  271-72. 
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C .  An Alternative Analytical Approach6' 
The first issue that should have been decided in Manypenny 
was whether state or federal law governs the state's right of ap- 
61. The following diagrams illustrate the analytical approach used by the 
Mcrnypennv court and the analytical approach suggested by this Note: 
A)tul!jticctl Approctch Used b g  the Manypenny Court 
The court began its analysis by applying the following rule: 
An appeal by the prosecution must be expressly authorized 
by statute. 
The solid lines represent the choices made by the court. 
The dotted lines represent options that the court recognized but did not take. 
Does a federal s ta tute  
authorize a n  appeal b Prosecution may 
a s ta te  prosecuting in 
federal court? 4 
I 
No I 
I 
v 
Can a s ta te  s ta tute  
s ta tute  t h a t  be used to author- 
izc this appeal? 
No I I 
I 
v I 
h 
No statutory authorization, therefore 
prosecution h a s  no r ight  to appeal. 
I 
+ ------- J 
No 
I 
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Awull~tical Approach Suggested by  this Note 
I by statute? I !  
. . 
Should s tate  or  
law govern a state's the prosecution be 
right of appeal? 
State 
Prosecution may 
bring this appeal 
if i t  is  not 
barred by the 
fifth amendnient. 
Does a federal statute 
authorize this appeal 
by a state prosecuting 
I [ Yes 
+ not appeal. 
-1 I may appeal. I 
Under state law must an  
appeal hy the prosecu- ------ 
tion bz expressly author- 
ized by the statute? may appeal. 
The double solid lines represent the choices advocated by this Note. 
The solid lines indicate the path which the court would have had to follow to reach its 
result using this analytical approach. 
The dotted lines represent other options. 
* ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 6 13-4032 (1979 Cum. Supp.) authorizes an appeal by the 
state from "[aln order arresting judgment," or "[aln order made after judgment affect- 
ing the substantial rights of the state." This statute could be used to authorize an appeal 
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peal. The case law and the Advisory Committee on Rules suggest 
a substantive-procedural test for deciding which law should gov- 
ern.62 However, the case law does not classify the right of appeal 
as procedural or substantive. The only guidance given by crimi- 
nal removal cases for making that  distinction is dictum in 
Virginia v. F e l t ~ , ~ Y n  which the court construed language in 
Tennessee v. Davis" '"as a direction to adopt the state law in all 
respects except as to mere matters of procedure."" The time lim- 
its for taking an appeal and the manner in which an appeal can 
be takev would seem to be such matters of procedure. But the 
right of appeal is a substantial right, one which parties would 
jealously guard, and certainly not a mere matter of procedure. 
Indeed, in 18 U.S.C. 8 3772,'Vhe statute authorizing the Su- 
preme Court to make rules governing procedure after verdict in 
criminal cases in federal court, Congress distinguished the right 
of appeal from matters of procedure saying, "The right of appeal 
shall continue in those cases in which appeals are authorized by 
law, but the rules made as herein authorized may prescribe the 
times for and manner of taking appeals . . . ."" Based on this 
language in section 3772 and on a commonsense distinction be- 
tween substance and procedure, the right of appeal appears to be 
substantive and, therefore, governed by state law. 
Allowing state law to govern a state's right of appeal also 
satisfies the pertinent policy considerations. Federal interests are 
not jeopardized if state law continues to govern the state's right 
of appeal following removal. Federal courts have no difficulty 
applying state law,M and there is no danger of harming the federal 
interests that removal is designed to prote~t .~ '  The federal govern- 
ment's interest in protecting its sovereign power is fully vindi- 
cated when removal takes place; its officers then have the privi- 
lege of pleading their defenses before a sympathetic forum. The 
in Manypenn.~.  See Arizona ex rel. Dawson v. Superior Court, 112 Ariz. 123,538 P.2d 397 
(1975); Arizona v. Allen, 27 Ariz. App. 577, 557 P.2d 176 (1976); Arizona v. Gradillas, 25 
Ariz. App. 510, 544 P.2d 1111 (1976). 
The dissent in Manypenny concluded that under state law the prosecution could 
appeal. 608 F.2d at 1202-03 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
62. See text accompanying notes 22-26 supra. 
63. 133 F. 85 (C.C.W.D. Va. 1904). 
64. For the language from Tennessee u. Davis, see text accompanying note 25 supra. 
65. 133 F. at 92. 
66. (1976). 
67. 18 U.S.C. (i 3772 (1976). 
68. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. at 271. 
69. For a discussion of the purpose of the removal statute, see text accompanying 
notes 15-16 supra. 
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removal statutes were designed to do no more than insure federal 
officers this opportunity: "Neither immunity nor impunity is 
guaranteed the alleged offender; the statute merely transfers his 
trial to the Federal courts."70 On the other hand, if the state's 
right of appeal is curtailed through the application of federal law 
when state criminal prosecutions are removed to federal courts, 
the state's sovereign interest in exercising its police powers is 
threatened. In such circumstances, a single federal judge could 
frustrate the state's legitimate law enforcement objectives by 
unreasonably expanding the defense of official immunity. The 
judge's error would never be remedied because it  could not be 
When the federal interests are balanced against the state's 
interests in the question of which law should govern the right of 
appeal in criminal removal cases, federal interests do not out- 
weigh the state's interest in protecting its police powers. There- 
fore, the court should apply the substantive-procedural test, 
which dictates that state law should govern. 
Assuming that it does decide that state law governs, the 
court should next consider whether state law requires express 
statutory authorization for an appeal by the prosecution. If there 
is no requirement for statutory authorization, the state may bring 
any appeal that is not barred by the double jeopardy prohibition. 
If express authorization is required, the court should examine the 
state's statutes for such authorization. For most states, the court 
will find authorization for appeal of a t  least some lower court 
Even if the court decides that the right of appeal is proce- 
dural, and therefore governed by federal law, it  does not necessar- 
ily follow that the state has no right of appeal. The statute, 18 
U.S.C. 8 3731, which authorizes appeals "by the United States,'' 
can be interpreted to authorize appeals by the states. The major- 
ity's strict interpretation of section 3731 is reasonable but not 
70. North Carolina v. Carr, 386 F.2d 129, 131 (4th Cir. 1967). 
71. For example, in the instant case, the trial judge did not know if the defense of 
official immunity should be treated as a matter of fact or as a matter of law. Arizona v. 
Manypenny. 445 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (D. Ariz. 1977). Such a question could not be 
resolved until a defendant appeals, because, under the Manypenny analysis, the state 
cannot appeal. If judges hereafter decide to treat it as a matter of law and always acquit 
defendants claiming that defense, the state can never test the correctness of the decision 
to characterize i t  as a matter of law. 
72. See note 31 supra. 
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compelling. especially in light of the statement in section 3731 
that "It \he provisions of this section shall be liberally construed 
to effectuate its  purpose^."^" In United States v. Wilsoni4 the 
Supreme Court followed this admonition and ruled that federal 
prosecutors could appeal from judgments of acquittal, although 
section 3731 mentions only decisions, judgments, or orders 
"dismissing an indictment or information." A construction of sec- 
tion 3731 allowing states to appeal would be consistent with the 
Court's approach in Wilson. 
Construing section 3731 to give the states a right of appeal 
would also be consistent with the way the Manypenny court ap- 
plied the federal version of the rule against appeals by the prose- 
cution to the state. Of necessity, the federal version of the rule 
applies only to the federal g o ~ e r n m e n t . ~ ~  By applying the federal 
version of the rule to the state, the court places the state in the 
position of the federal government. Once in the position of the 
federal government for purposes of applying the rule limiting 
appeals to those authorized by statute, the state should be left 
in that position for purposes of applying section 3731. 
Even though section 3731 can reasonably be interpreted to 
authorize appeals by state prosecutions, there are some inherent 
problems with applying federal law to decide if a state prosecu- 
tion has a right of appeal. If section 3731 is construed to give a 
right of appeal only to the United States, problems of federalism 
arise.?Wn the other hand, if section 3731 is construed to grant a 
right of appeal to states in addition to the federal government, 
some states will have greater rights of appeal in federal court than 
they would have in their own courts.77 In those states, defendants 
with a right of removal may be chilled in the exercise of this right 
by the knowledge that the state has greater rights of appeal in 
federal court. 
73. 18 U.S.C. 4 3731 (1976). 
74. 420 U.S. 332 (1975). 
75. See note 33 supra. 
76. Congress could solve the federalism problems by amending § 3731 to provide for 
appeals by state prosecutions in federal court. 
77. For a discussion of the limitations on the rights of the various states to appeal in 
criminal cases in their own courts, see note 31 supra. As interpreted in United States v. 
Wilson. 420 U.S. at  337. 4 3731 grants the right of appeal in all cases in which appeal by 
the prosecution is not barred by the double jeopardy prohibition. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The Manbypenny decision is not based on thorough analysis. 
The court failed to adequately consider whether state or federal 
law should govern the state's right of appeal. It dismissed the 
possibility of using state law to authorize an appeal, relying on 
authority that does not apply to criminal removal cases. The 
court also failed to consider the substantive-procedural test that  
has previously been used in criminal removal cases for determin- 
ing which law should govern. Had the court applied this test it 
probably would have decided that the right of appeal was sub- 
stantive, and therefore governed by state law. Moreover, the 
court's decision does not satisfy policy considerations involving 
the balance of federalism that apply to the issues. The denial of 
a state's right of appeal in a criminal removal case when the state 
would have had a right of appeal in its own courts is a serious 
invasion of that state's sovereignty, an invasion that is not neces- 
sary to effectuate the purposes of the removal statutes. These 
considerations of federalism and a careful analysis of the applica- 
ble law lead to the conclusion that state law should govern the 
right of appeal in criminal removal cases. 
J. Grant Walker 
